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ABSTRACT
The General Accounting Office, in a report on uneco-
nomical management of commercially available supply items, sub-
jected the Department of Defense and the Navy Department
to extensive criticism concerning their centralized management
of supply items. This research paper examined the GAO re-
port and determined that, while the financial savings and sta-
tistical methods employed left some doubt as to the validity
of the results, it was obvious that commercially available items
were being centrally managed uneconomically . This paper exam-
ined the known factors affecting the decision, both economic
and noneconomic. It was concluded that a mathematical model
could be developed incorporating these factors that would be
applicable service-wide and permit the inventory manager to
make a management decision on decentralization. However,
several of the factors require more analysis and it was recom-
mended that further studies be conducted in these areas . It
was finally noted that the decentralization decision should be
approached with caution in order not to obviate the gains al-
ready made by the Defense Supply Agency and the Navy in
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THE PROBLEM AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
The General Accounting Office (GAO), an agency in the
Legislative Branch of the Government headed by the Comptrol-
ler General, is responsible solely to the Congress. The
Congress has directed the Comptroller General to perform
"external" audits of all expenditures made by Departments of
the Executive Branch to insure that public funds are being
expended in accordance with appropriations. As part of their
responsibilities the General Accounting Office published Report
Number B-146828, titled "Uneconomical Management of Com-
mercially Available Items". The report subjected the Depart-
ment of Defense, and the Defense Supply Agency to extensive
criticism over the decision of central management versus
decentralized management of commercially available items of
supply.
I. THE PROBLEM
Statement of the problem . It is the purpose of this
paper to (1) analyze the GAO report in detail; (2) identify
factors affecting centralized versus decentralized management
1
Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and
Accounting and Auditing Act, 1950 (31 U.S.C, 67)

of supply items; and (3) to develop a model which will aid
inventory managers in making supply management decisions,
II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
Centralized management . Inventory control points are
responsible for all interrelated functions pertaining to the
supply of items specified. These functions include catalog-
ing, determination of requirements, procurement, storage,
and distribution.
Decentralized management . Authority is delegated to
using activities, or in some cases subordinate supply levels,
to procure their requirements of specified items from com-
mercial sources, other military activities, or other Govern-
ment activities such as the General Services Administration.
This procedure is known, generally, as local purchase or
base procurement.
Economic Order Quantity ( EOQ) . A supply technique
used to compute replenishment order quantities of consuma-
ble material whereby the cost to order is equated against
the cost of carrying the inventory to achieve the most eco-
nomical procurement, storage and inventory practices.
Military specifications . Documents intended primarily
for use in procurement, which are clear, accurate des-
criptions of the technical requirements for items, materials,
or services, including the procedures by which it will be
2

determined that the requirements have been met. Specifi-
cations for items and materials also contain preservation,
packaging, packing and marking requirements.
Central procurement . The process of acquiring ma-
terial to meet service-wide requirements. It includes the
functions of design, standards determination, specification
•writing, selection of suppliers, financing, contract admin-
istration, and other related functions.
Local procurement or purchase . Procurement of
material by an installation for consumption at that instal-
lation or its satellited activities or smaller stations.
Requisition
,
Material . An authorized request or order
for specified material submitted by a user or distribution
point on a designated supplying point in accordance with
the supply procedures of the military service involved
.
Automatic data processing (ADP
)
. The processing
(classifying, sorting, calculating, summarizing, recording,
printing) of data through the use of electronic digital com-
puters, communications channels and devices used with such
computers, and associated peripheral equipment » Includes




DISCUSSION OF PRESENT CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
DECENTRALISED MANAGEMENT
A review of the available directives, instructions, and
the GAO report reveals that the policy and the criteria for
determining which items of supply shall be centrally managed
and which items shall be decentrally managed vary between
services, between stations within a service, and between the
Defense Supply Agency and its activities.
Since <July 1955 the Department of Defense has pre-
scribed that the military departments, in peacetime, should
place optimum reliance upon local management and procurement
of material. The applicable DOD Instruction directs thati
Consistent with military necessity, the Department
of Defense in peacetime will place optimum reliance on
local management and procurement of required material,
with optimum elimination of the use of Department of
Defense storage and distribution systems and related
services. Where it is considered by the inventory con-
trol point or commodity Single Manager that a decen-
tralized item would not be available in sufficient quanti-
ty to requiring activities or installations in a period of
mobilization or war, plans will be formulated by the
inventory control point or commodity Single Manager
to revert to centralized control when mobilization or
wartime conditions make it necessary.
At Army locations GAO found that anticipated usage of
an item primarily determined whether it would be centrally
2Department of Defense Instruction i+140.7 dated 9
February 1961, Subject: Control, Supply and Positioning of
Material

stocked. At the Engineer Maintenance Center, for example,
items were selected for stockage on the basis of anticipated
annual requirements of as low as 5 items per 100 pieces of
supported equipment. An item was retained in central stocks
under criteria which included: (1) the item is requested 3
times a year, or once a year for missile components; (2) the
item is on an overseas stock list; and, (3) the item has a
3
mobilization reserve requirement.
At the Yards and Docks Supply Office, GAO found
that items qualified for central stockage on the basis of
actual or anticipated issues amounting to $200 or more
annually.^-
Air Force Regulations provide that "no item will be
designated for base procurement (i.e., local purchase) un-
less it meets all of the following criteria: (1) the item is
a commercial type, (2) the item is in commerical distribution,
(3) the item does not require detailed military inspection and
quality control at base level, and (4) the item does not
affect flying safety nor the required performance of an
aircraft or missile." In September 1961 the regulation
was revised and criteria (4) was deleted*.
3
Comptroller General of the United States Report Num-
ber 3-12+6828 dated 29 November 1963, Subject: Report on
Uneconomical Management of Commercially Available Items, p 22,
L
Ibid.
, p . 23 .
^Air Force Regulation 67-3 dated 20 March 1958.

The Defense Industrial Supply Center regulation states
that its policy is to decontrol items to the maximum practicable
extent and that centrally managed items be screened, as time
6
permits, for possible decontrol.
All of the DOD and the services directives, except the
Air Force, restrict local purchases to the immediate local
trade area. However, an analysis by the Armed Forces
Supply Support Center showed that from 26 to 68 percent
f all local purchases were actually made outside a 100 mile
radius of the installation.' Thus, it is apparent that exist-
ing regulations are more restrictive than necessary according
to actual practices of some using activities in selecting the
most expedient supply source.
From the above information it is readily apparent that
a program must be initiated within the Department of Defense
to provide a policy and definitive criteria for deciding on cen-
tralized versus decentralized methods of management of all
items of supply.
Comptroller General Report, loc. cit.
7
Armed Forces Supply Support Center Study Project
59-3 dated November 1959.

CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT
I
General Accounting Office Report Number B-li+6828 was
critically analyzed in order to examine the cost and statistical
data that the report developed. The result of this examina-
tion and comments on the report are summarized in the para-
graphs that follow.
I. METHOD OF DETERMINING COSTS
In determining the total number of line items that GAO
felt could be decentralized, six Department of Defense Inven-
tory Control Points were studied:
Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, Penna,
(DISC) 47,000 line items
Engineering Maintenance Center, Columbus, Ohio
(EMC) 107,000 line items
Yards and Docks Supply Office, Port Hueneme, Calif,
(YDSO) 108,000 line items
Aviation and Surface Material Command, St. Louis, Mo.
(AVSCOM) 209,000 line items
Rome Air Material Area, Rome, New York
(ROAMA) 87,000 line items
Mobile Air Material Area, Mobile, Alabama
(MOAMA) 243,000 line items
The GAO report looked at 561,000 minor items of supply,
consisting primarily of hardware, repair parts, industrial
supplies, and other low volume items, at the six inventory
control points. Of the 561,000 items, 2+71,000, or 81+%, had
7

an annual sales issue value to retail customers of less than
$2+00. 258,000, or 1+&%i had no issues at all during the cur-
rent year. From the arbitrary cutoff of $2+00 the GAO
estimated that the economies of central procurement would
outweigh the additional costs incurred by central management
and therefore concentrated on the items with issues under
$i+00.
From the 2+71,000 items available and meeting the dollar
limitations of annual issues, 2,612+ items were selected by
random or systematic sampling methods for detailed examina-
tion. (The method of selecting the items is discussed in
detail in a later section of this chapter.)
The 2,612+ supply items selected were not in proportion
to the number of items stocked. No attempt was made to
pinpoint trouble areas, or determine that one Inventory Con-
trol Point had more of a problem than others, or that one
area was more susceptible to decentralization than another.
From the 2,612+ items selected the GAO determined,
either by personal visit or correspondence with the retailers
or distributors, that the item was available at the local
level. If not available at the local level, manufacturers
were contacted to see if the item was nationally distributed
and the length of time required to obtain the item. The item
was considered readily available if it was either in stock locally
or could be obtained from the factory within a 30 day period,
8

since this compared favorably with the issue time for a routine
demand from central inventory control points.
Using the above criteria, the GAO determined that 942
items, or 3&% of the total, were readily available from com-
mercial sources. There appears to be a discrepancy in the
number of items that were considered as being available from
commercial sources as the report further states;; "A pro-
jection of the results of our tests to the i+71,538 low volume
minor line items of supply in inventories at the six central
inventory control points reviewed indicated that about 150,300
items, or 32 percent, could have been decontrolled and pro-
cured directly by using activities." The discrepancy of 4
percent in the above figures cannot be reconciled., Since the
total number of items that were considered available from
commercial sources was based upon this percentage, the pro-
jected savings cannot be derived.
II. COST SAVINGS
The GAO report developed an annual average cost of
$114 to centrally manage a minor item of supply. This figure
was derived by taking the total operating costs of an activity
(Central Inventory Control Point), excluding certain costs,
such as staff and command organizational costs, high value
item management costs, and the non-applicable operating costs 9
and dividing this total by the number of minor supply items
managed. Although this figure will give a manager a rough
9

estimate of costs it does not appear to have sufficient valid-
ity to actually make a determination in the final analysis wheth-
er an item should be centrally or decentrally managed.,
The GAO report made the rather heroic assumption that
the costs to obtain an item by local purchase were practically
the same as to order the item for resupply from a military
depot.
The report compared the price paid for an item by in-
ventory managers against local procurement prices, and found
that the local procurement prices exceeded the central pro-
curement prices by 30 percent. (This percentage was based
on a sample of only 274 out of the 2,612+ items examined,)
The potential savings were then derived by the following
computation:
(1) Multiply the central management cost of $112+ per line
item by the total number of items in the 6 Inventory
Control Points to be decentralized > As noted above,
this figure turned out to be 150,300, although the method
of determination could not be validated,
$112+ x 150,300 items equals $17, 134,200
(2) Subtract 30$ that the local purchase price exceeded the
central procurement price times 150,300 items times
average annual issue of $2+6.,
30$ x 150,300 items x $2+6 per item equals $2,074,100
10

(3) This gave a potential savings on the 150,300 items of
$15,060,100. (Item (1) less item (2)).
This savings was then projected to the entire Department
of Defense range of items by the following methods
(a) The 6 Inventory Control Points studied were responsible
for approximately one million items of minor supply. Of
these, as previously noted, 150,300 were recommended for
decentralization, or about 15$ of the total items.
(b) This 15$ was projected to the total Department of De-
fense range of items of 1+.& million, less 1 million items
in Federal Supply Classification classes 10-22+. (major end
items and military equipments)
,
for a total of approxi-
mately 550,000 recommended for decentralization over the
entire Department of Defense range,
(c) Based on the savings of $15,060,100 on the 150,300 items
noted above, a savings of about $50,000,000 was developed.
The requirements for control and positioning of material
by the Inventory Control Points are set forth in DOD Instruc-
tion 24.H4.0
.
7 dated 9 February 1961. This instruction gives
definitive guidelines to the DOD activities with regard to the
determination of centralized versus decentralized managemento
It is therefore somewhat disturbing to find that of the range
of items examined by GAO , on a projected basis, k&% had no
movement during the year, another 11$ had average issues
under $10, and a total of 8k% had issues of under $i+00 per
11

year, and all were still being centrally managed „ There is
little doubt that GAO has hit upon a fertile area, and that
the inventory managers need to take a hard look at the items
that they manage, with a view toward reducing expenditures
by decentralized management. There is no argument with the
inactivity of centrally managed items that GAO pointed out;
however, there is some doubt as to the magnitude of savings
that could be affected. It is the intention to further ana-
lyze these savings, and propose, within the limitations of
time and information available, a better method to determine
the scope of control of an item, including the development
of a mathematical model.
III. STATISTICAL METHODS
The use of statistical methods to make a judgement or
inference about the aggregate or universe is scientifically
sound. However, statistical data upon which the judgement
or inference is made must be collected or secured in a man-
ner that will not bias the data and thus the results, This
is done by random sampling.
A detailed examination of the GAO report reveals that
the Inventory Control Points and the items of supply that
were investigated were not necessarily selected by random
means and thus the results of the survey may be biased.
For example, no indication is made of how the supply
activities were selected. At AVSCOM 475 items were
12

selected at random from a machine listing. At EMC a machine
print-out of ready issuable stock with annual demands of under
$400 -was used and every 150th item selected, The report
does not indicate how the items were selected for review at
the other four activities.
A machine print-out by Federal Stock Number or FUN
number is not a random listing due to the biased method of
assignment of the Federal Stock Number; therefore, selection
of every Nth item does not produce an unbiased selective
random sample. Only random samples permit objective gener-
alizations from the sample to the whole population
.
The science of statistics is important in all phases of
sample design and analysis. The concept of a sample drawn
from a universe or population is fundamental in statistical
theory. That universe is an aggregate of a finite number or
infinite number of units of a specified kind, each unit having
associated with it one or more attributes or quantitative
measurements which are to be studied. The statistician
thinks in terms of one or more numerical constants or para-
meters that are characteristic of, or specify, his population
„
Such a parameter might be the average of all measurements
of a particular type in the entire population, the percent of
units falling in a particular category, or some other descrip-
tive characteristic of the population . Corresponding estimates
of the parameters, computed from only the sample data, are
13

known as statistics. The practical sampler makes use of these
ideas whenever he attempts to draw inferences about a universe
from sample data.
In sampling, as in any statistical problem, the first con-
sideration is to define the universe to which the estimates are
to apply. This definition must be specific and it should be
laid down before the sample is drawn. A universe may be
either finite or infinite. An infinite universe consists of an
unlimited supply of units while a finite universe consists of a
specified number of units. The theory of statistics usually
deals with an infinite universe. But in most sampling problems
the universe is finite; this means that the usual rules utilized
must be modified to be applicable.
The individual units making up the universe do not have
to be natural elements; they may be defined in any way that
is convenient for practical purposes. A sample should be
drawn from the universe according to some rule specifying
which units are to be selected. This means that the universe
must be defined in terms of units to which such a rule can be
applied.
There are several methods of taking samples . Among
the most common ones are:
8
Walter A. Hendricks, The Mathematical Theory of
Sampling (New Brunswick, New Jersey: The Scarecrow
Press, 1956), pp. 1-22.
14

(1) Simple Random Sampling
(a) Purposive Selection
(2) Systematic Sampling




A sample is a selected portion of some universe drawn to
provide information about the universe as a whole, A sample
must be drawn from a universe according to definite rules.
The rules specifying how individual units are to be selected
constitute the sample design.
One of the most elementary sample designs is the Simple
Random Sample. It is important to remember that a simple
random sample of "n" sampling units must be selected in such
a way that every combination of "n" sampling units that can
be formed has an equal chance of being selected. As indicated
previously, a simple random sample of "n" can be obtained by
drawing "n" sampling units from the universe one at a time,
without replacement, in such a way that each unit present in
the universe at every draw has an equal chance of being
q
selected.
The simple random sample has many attractive features.








are used, and the unbiased estimating procedures usually take
rather simple forms. Secondly, the statistical analysis of
data from such a sample usually involves mathematical formulas
of minimum complexity. It is often said that the random
design insures that the sample -will be "representative" of the
universe from which it is drawn. But it will be "representa-
tive" only in the sense that it is unbiased ; any one sample may
fail considerably to give a good picture of the universe from
which it was drawn. In an unlimited number of repeated
trials all errors would average out; however, a sampling
method that will produce the right answer with a single
sample is desired.
There is usually considerable variability between sampling
units with respect to the characteristic under investigation;
consequently, estimates derived from simple random samples
are subject to large sampling errors. These large errors can
be reduced when the sample size is small by making "purposive
selection": A method of selecting individual sampling units
by inspection to make the sample conform as closely as pos-
sible to the universe.
The objective of purposive selection is good; however,
there is a question as to whether or not the objective is
actually attained in practice. The precision with which a pur-
posive sample represents the universe depends largely upon
the skill of the person who selects it. Individuals often differ
16

in their judgements about the set of sampling units which is
most representative of the universe as a whole Errors of
judgement made by an individual usually do not average out
in repeated trials. Every individual has a personal bias in
one direction or the other of which he may be completely
unaware; the nature and degree of the bias may vary from
one individual to another. To some extent, such personal
biases can be made smaller through training and experience,
but it seems to be impossible to get rid of them entirely
„
The presence, or at least the likelihood of the presence, of
such biases in purposive samples constitutes an objection to
their use.
Simple random sampling eliminates all personal bias from
the selection of sample units, the sample data themselves
would supply all the information needed to compute valid esti-
mates of precision, and conclusions about the universe could
be expressed as probability statements. However, suppose
that only one sampling unit is to be drawn from a universe
for study. Obviously, if it were selected at random it might
be one that was not at all typical of the universe as a whole
„
If all units in the universe were inspected and one selected
by judgement it would very likely be more representative > The
personal bias, if any, of the individual who selected the unit
would practically always be smaller than the sampling error
associated with a random selection. Now suppose two units
17

are to be selected. The average for two units chosen by pur-
posive selection -would also come closer to the universe average
than would an average from a random sample of two, But,
if this experiment were continued with progressively larger
samples, experience has shown that the standard error of an
average estimated from a random sample becomes progres-
sively smaller as the simple size becomes larger j it can be
made as small as desired by taking a sufficiently large sample <,
But with the purposive sample any personal bias on the part
of the individual making the selection tends to remain at about
the same size. With smaller samples the bias, and therefore
the error, from the purposive sample is smaller than the
error for a random sample j but with large samples that bias
1 D
eventually exceeds the sampling error from the random sample
o
If a random sample is to be selected from a universe^,
an identification number is attached to each unit and the
selection is made by means of a table of random numbers
„
Such tables contain numbers made up of randomly assorted
digits so that when a set of consecutive numbers is taken
from the table and used to specify the sampling units to be






If the clerical work of assigning identification numbers
becomes impractical due to the number of units in the universe
a second method of taking a random sample is utilized which
is called a systematic sample. In a systematic sample the
units of the universe are listed by some random means. The
first unit is selected by the use of a table of random numbers
and then every Nth unit is selected . When units are listed
in a random order a systematic sample will behave as a random
sample and for all practical purposes it may be regarded as
a random sample so long as the starting unit is selected at
random .
Simple random sampling, purposive selection random
sampling or systematic selection appear to be the sample
design methods most adaptable to the records available at
any supply activity. By using any one of these three methods
an unbiased sample can be drawn, upon which an inference
about the aggregate universe can be made that is scientifi-
cally sound.
In some special cases other more elaborate sampling
methods might be utilized. A brief description of these
methods follows.
In stratified random sampling the population is divided
into a number of sub-groups according to some relevant
19

characteristic, and a simple random sample is then taken from
each group.
Cluster sampling refers to sample designs in -which groups
of neighboring individuals are used as sample units o A segment
of an area is regarded as a cluster. In most applications of
12
cluster sampling, every individual in the cluster is contacted
,
A quota sample is a judgement sample. In a quota sample,
the interviewer is required to question a certain number of
persons with given characteristics j for instance, he may be
asked to interview twenty men living in a certain group of
blocks, who fall within a certain age class, and whose income
falls within a given range. -*
Area sampling is an application of cluster sampling -
with other design features interwoven - dispersed populations.
It is based on a simple idea: The units in the population
can be associated with geographical areas. By drawing a
probability sample of these areas, and sampling appropriately
within them, it is possible to obtain a probability sample of
the population . ^h
11W. Allen Wallis and Harry V, Roberts, Statistics A
New Approach (Glencoe, Illinois s The Free Press, 1956),
pp. 117-119.
12
Hendricks, op_. cit .
, pp. 250-251.
13John Neter and William Wasserman, Fundamental
Statistics for Business and Economics (New Yorks Allyn and
Bacon, Inc., 1956), p. 294«





FACTORS AFFECTING MANAGEMENT CRITERIA
The decision to centralize or decentralize the management
of any item of supply is not an easy one when all factors are
taken into account. The economic factors, though important,
may not be the critical factors to be considered. In fact,
several non—economic factors must be investigated and certain
criteria met prior to consideration of the economic aspects
of the problem.
In the subsequent paragraphs several economic and non-
economic factors are listed which may affect any decision, A
brief description of each factor is given along with an evalu-
ation of its affect on the problem of centralized versus de-
centralized management of an item of supply,,
I. NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS
Commercial or Government Services Administration Availability
The first consideration in determining whether to de-
centralize or continue to centrally manage an item is the
ready availability of the item at the decentralized location, in
sufficient quantity to fill all the demands . In terms of
"ready availability" the same delivery criteria should be applied
to the item that is applied to items ordered through a cen-
tralized inventory control point. Emergency requests (based
21

on a uniform military priority system) should be available instan-
taneously, up to a maximum of 24 to 48 hours. Routine requests
should be available within 30 days, (This is the average length
of time required by using activities to obtain a routine item
through a centralized inventory control system, without the use
of any premium handling or premium transportation,)
Those items which the Government Services Administration
(GSA) has accepted management control should be readily
identifiable and this information could be published in the various
stock lists of material (catalogs). These items would normally
be the items for which GSA already has management control,
(e.g., office equipment and supplies) or new items that the
service organizations are offering to GSA prior to decen-
tralization. Current DOD policy requires that GSA must be
given a chance to incorporate the item into its system, once
the Inventory Control Point has decided it does not want to
centrally manage the item. It should be noted that at this
point the subject of the responsiveness of GSA to military
requirements is still an unknown quantity, Because of the
nature of office machines and supplies, the urgency of re-
quirements is not very high, and therefore GSA has not
been called upon to exert any speedy response, but if they
get into the area of pure military items, this problem may de-
serve further consideration and study.
22

The remaining items subject to commercial availability-
would require considerable more research. Information avail-
able to the decontrolling inventory control point through
procurement records might well provide the information as
to the availability of the item at the local level, through
regional or national distributors. If this information is not
available at the Inventory Control Point, the information
must be obtained from manufacturers, and wholesalers or
distributors. Due to the potential volume of stock numbers
that could feasibly be involved in a management decision, this
information should be the responsibility of the decontrolling
Inventory Control Point, and not be left to the local level
to obtain. Care should be taken to ensure that the same
item that is being centrally managed would be available com-
mercially. Certainly items with a military specification, or
even with certain required military characteristics should be
subject to close inspection if the identical item purchased at
the central level is to be available commercially. GAO stated
in their report that items were "in stock locally" or "avail-
able in 1 to 30 days", when they contacted retailers, dis-
tributors, and manufacturers. It has been the writers'
experience in military procurement that distributors are
prone to inflate their availability, and the real proof of
actual delivery times will only be determined when some pro-
curement experience has been gained by actual orders, Of
23

particular importance to the Navy will be the response to a
demand by a deployed ship for a decontrolled item. It will
make little difference to the ship whether the item is centrally
or decentrally managed, as long as it is available when demanded.
In addition to the item being commercially available, it
must be available in sufficient quantities to meet military re-
quirements. An item may be commercially available but not
generally available through commercial distributor's channels
in the quantity required by the military installation. For
example replacement requirements may be available in quantities
required from commercial sources, but initial requirements
necessary for set assembly programs are generally of greater
quantity and must be available at a specific time and may re-
quire special production runs to produce the required quantity
Also, the requirements for afloat and overseas commands
may be larger in quantity that is normally available on the
1 c
commercial market. D
It is apparent then, that a determination of commercial
availability is an important decision in decentralization, and
one that will require a great amount of research, and perhaps
some actual experience to determine ready availability If a
favorable determination is not reached on this very important
ISDefense General Supply Center, Directorate for
Supply Control Policies and Procedures Number 701-1 dated 19
August 1962, Subject: Criteria for Determining Centralized
Versus Decentralized Item Management, Sub-Paragraph 7a,
24

factor there is no need to proceed further in a management
decision on decentralization.
Feasibility of Central Forecasting
Before an item can be effectively centrally managed
,
it must be determined that it is feasible to centrally fore-
cast requirements for the item and the essentiality of central
accumulation of consumption data on the item for management
purposes.
There are various tools of central forecasting, and with
the range of choices available today, in our sophisticated
inventory system, the inventory manager should be able to
make a reasonable forecast, using the scientific methods
available.
The inventory manager, through the use of Automatic
Data Processing has a variety of forecasting systems avail-
able. Below is a partial list of choices available to him for
forecasting future requirements „
Last period's demand . This implies simply taking the last
period's demand as the basis for ordering the next period's
requirement. "
Simple average . Divide the available consumption by the
16
Robert G. Brown, Statistical Forecasting for Inven-




number of periods, either a predetermined number, or the
total available. '
Moving average . This system involves dropping out the
oldest demand information and adding the newest. The total
is then divided by a predetermined number of periods „ For
example, a moving average over a 6 month period would drop
out the first month's consumption, add the seventh month
1 ftto obtain the existing 6 month average.
Weighted moving average . A weighted moving average is
similar to a moving average, except it places pre-determined
weights on the figures, usually weighting the old average
heavily, either .8 or . 9> and the new data lightly, either <>2
or .1. There are other refinements to this system, such as
correction for trend, but these are considered beyond the
scope of this paper. 9
Exponential smoothing . This system is similar to the
techniques of weighting moving average, but does not require
the accumulation of excessive historical data. 2 ^
Number of installed equipments . Number of equipments

















Manufacturer's recommendations In the absence of other
information or if the equipment is completely new, the manu-
facturer's recommendations on items to be stocked may be the
best information available.
It can easily be seen that if a manager desires to cen-
trally manage an item he has a multitude of forecasting methods
available. If he does determine to centrally manage, he must
use some method of forecasting in order to stock on a system
basis, regardless of validity.
If it is not possible to forecast centrally, or if it is
not essential to centrally accumulate demand data, then the
item should not even be considered for central managements
Decentralization of the decision-making function has many
advantages. The man on the spot can act quickly and flexibly
as he has intimate first-hand knowledge of many factors rele-
vant to his decisions. Large hierarchical organizations, by
contrast, tend to be sluggish and hidebound by rules and regu-
lations. Much of their time is consumed in attempting to
assemble, at the center, the information so readily available
"on the firing line"; since their efforts are very rarely suc-
cessful, their decisions have to be made on the basis of infor-
mation that is both incomplete and staled
21
Charles a. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Eco -
nomics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp» 236-239°
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Degree of Perishability (Shelf Life)
If an item has a short shelf life, it is a prime candidate
for decentralization. It is reasonable to assume that an item
that will deteriorate within a short period of time should not
be centrally procured, because it will be subject to deteriora-
tion before use unless it is pre-positioned in exactly the right
quantities by location, which isn't likely under the DSA con-
cept of using intermediate distribution depots.
Perishability also becomes a limiting parameter in de-
termining the economic order quantity to procure • If an
item has a 6 month shelf life, this is the maximum quantity
that can be bought, regardless of the economic order quantity o
The old General Stores Supply Office, the Military In-
dustrial Supply Agency, and the current Defense Industrial
Supply Center use a figure of 6 months shelf life, and decon-
trol all items below this figure.
Perishability includes such terms as shelf life, deteri-
oration, and required check and test procedures.
Rate of Obsolescence
Before the economic factors of controlling an item are
considered, the rate of obsolescence should be studied* There
are two schools of thought on this subject, relative to the
degree of information available.
If one could assume near perfect information at the local
level, as to the various factors leading toward obsolescence
28

it would be better to have the item decentrally managed, so
that stocks could be policed and held to a minimum, This would
minimize the dollar value of losses due to requirements that
no longer existed.
If, however, adequate information concerning obsolescence
is not available, or used, at the local level, it would be better
to centrally manage the item. It is considered more likely
that the best information would be available at the Inventory
Control Point, because of its access to more technical infor-
mation, access to the original requiring activity (e.g M ASO
to BuWeps and CNO)
,
and the fact that you have "less fingers
in the pie". When an error is made, however, it will be a
big one, since it will be system wide, whereas locally only a
few would perhaps make the same error. Hitch and McKean
aptly expressed the idea when they said, "Unfortunately the
superficial illogicalities of decentralization are more strikingly
obvious than the deadening consequences of extreme central-
ization."22
Central management would also lend itself to redistri-
bution of existing stocks, vice procurement, of foreseeable
obsolescent items.
Rate of Consumption




decentralized management is probably one of the most contro-
versial of the group. Ideally, if time permitted, each inven-
tory manager would comply with the Department of Defense
instructions on decentralization by making an item-by-item
review, and considering all known factors for each item How-
ever, time and money limitations preclude this for most items,
particularly for low value ones, and a monetary cut-off may
be used, based on annual sales volume,
GAO, in their report, used $i+00 annual sales as the cut-
off point. This appears to be quite a liberal figure, since
most of the items considered were of the low value, non-
technical category.
Defer: se General Supply Center, in its discussions on
decentralized management, pointed out that item by item
review was most desirable, but that if this were not possible,
they recommended a $75 annual central sales as a cut-off
point. The old General Stores Supply Office used a figure of
$100 as the consideration point for decentralization, provided
they had adequate data on which to base their determination .
Military Essentiality
Military essentiality has been described in varying terms
by different writers. It has been called spare part essenti-
ality, criticality, and shortage-penalty „ Shortages of some
parts are far more serious than shortages of others, and if
these differences can be taken into account when making
30

procurement and stocking decisions, the usefulness of any given
amount of inventory investment can be increased The evalu-
ation of supply management's performance also can be made
more precise if the difference in shortage seriousness can be
taken into consideration. 3
Military essentiality should play an important part in a
decision to centrally or decentrally manage an item, The de-
gree to which it is ranked in importance would be subject to
the type of material being rated, and the mission of the
equipment being supported. Obviously an item coded as support
for a Polaris submarine will have a higher ranking than an
item essential to an auxiliary vessel. The first consideration
then in military essentiality is to devise a system of select-
ing those items which have a degree of essentiality. This is
a major problem of a supply management system, and one which
is almost a separate study in itself. Once the range of items
has been determined, each item should be categorized as to
its affect on the mission of the major equipment it is sup-
porting, H. W. Karr, in his article "A Method of Esti-
mating Spare-part Essentiality" uses two other factors,
besides mission effect, namely urgency and compensability,
21
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However, for purposes of this report the broad term "mission
effect" is considered to encompass all the characteristics.
The effect of a shortage categorized as a "military essential"


























It can be seen that once a requirement is categorized
"essential", and the decision to install cannot be postponed or
compensated, depending upon the degree of essentiality, the
equipment either had limited capability or is useless
.
Once all items have been coded as to "military essentiality",
the question of decentralization must be faced • Department
of Defense instructions on the subject, which are currently
under review and revision, indicate that an inventory control
manager should determine the feasibility or desirability of
management only after this factor, along with several others,
has been considered. 2 However, in the GAO report, although









such was not discussed. It is possible that the range of items
examined were such that they had as yet not been classified
as to "military essentiality" since they were more in the cate-
gory of general purpose material.
Despite the uneconomical aspect of stocking and centrally
managing, items with a high military essentiality coding should
be considered for central management and stocking, because
of their relative importance to the military operation . When
projected across the entire system, into the areas of aircraft,
weapon systems, and ships spare parts, this should be an im-
portant factor, and stock availability becomes decidedly more
important than any economies of commercial procurement that
might be gained.
Mobilization Reserves
Certain items in the military supply system are categor-
ized as "mobilization reserves" because of their projected
immediate requirements in the event of hostilities „ Current
DOD instructions provide that items normally available from
commercial sources in sufficient quantities to meet war
reserve military demands will not be selected as mobilization
reserves. Exceptions are permitted when military consider-
ations indicate that commercial type items must be prepo-
sitioned prior to mobilization day. When it is considered that
a decentralized item would not be available in sufficient
quantities to requiring activities in a period of mobilization
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or war, plans should be formulated by the inventory manager
or commodity manager to revert to centralized management
when mobilization or wartime conditions make it necessary '
With the above criteria established by DOD, commercial
availability appears to be an overriding factor to mobilization
reserves. However, in making this determination the respon-
siveness of the commercial market to a crisis should be
established. This involves a large area of judgement on what
type of war will be waged » It appears in our national security
planning we must consider three types of war - ail out
thermonuclear war, limited local actions of a holding or
counter offensive character, or a large scale 9 prolonged type 9
like World War II, in which strategic bombing of cities is
either withheld, or if attempted, is ineffective on both sides
»
Of the three, the prolonged World War II type appears the
? ftleast likely. Using the present DOD concept, this pre-
supposes there will be adequate time available to re-control
items that have been decontrolled, and there is therefore no
necessity to have mobilization stocks of these items „ Military
essentiality and mobilization reserves go hand-in-hand, and if
there is a feeling that time will be of the essence - that
27
Department of Defnese Instruction i+li+Oo?, ojDo crt „
,
Paragraph V(c).
28Hitch, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
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there is not time to count on the civilian sources - then per-
haps mobilization requirements should be the overriding factor
,
and not commercial availability
.
Proximity of Requiring Activity
In order to decentralize an item, the requiring activity
must not only have ready access to a local market, but it must
have adequate procurement capabilities to make the desired
purchases. Large service activities in large industrial com-
plexes have no problem, but if you take away either the size
or the market, problems may develop . The U c S c Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey is a point in case. Although
the demands for material placed on it are relatively small, and
of the normal variety, from the standpoint of a local market,
there is not a great range of items available on the Monterey
Peninsula and it lies just outside the oft quoted 100 mile radius
of a large market, San Francisco » It does have a large
military activity nearby, in Fort Ord and it could be utilized
under cross-servicing arrangements.
This is also quite applicable for overseas activities and
ships. The GAO report makes considerable note of the fact
that designated purchasing activities could purchase and ship
items in sufficient time to satisfy demands, Military es-
sentiality would provide centralized management of those items
so designated, and would therefore take care of the militarily
more important items; however, for that range of items that
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might otherwise be decentralized this factor would certainly
have to be considered.
The Navy could use existing facilities at the Naval Supply
Centers, Oakland and Norfolk to care for its deployed ships
and overseas points. These centers are already organization-
ally in the DSA distribution system, and could be immediately
utilized in the event of a decentralization decision, In order
to satisfy overseas and ships demands in sufficient time it
would appear that emergency procurement and premium trans-
portation would have to be utilized in order to provide an
acceptable service level, The alternative to this would be
to maintain all items in stock for ships and overseas points
;
however, this could be contrary to other decentralization
policies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the
service rendered to ships and overseas points. This is an
important point for Navy consideration, and for those items
that will not be centrally managed due to military essentiality,
a study should be conducted to determine in fact that port
overseas supply activities, or inventory control points could
provide adequate service without maintaining depot stocks
.
Item Cube
Items which are large or bulky, or which have a high
density in relation to the unit cost should be considered for
decentralized management. The overriding factor in this
point is transportation costs, both first destination and
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subsequent destination costs. The classic example of high
density, low unit cost items are building and construction ma-
terials (i.e., sand, gravel, etc.), These items are also
expensive to store, regardless of management responsibility,
and would have this further limiting factor, where it would
probably be cheaper to procure as required, rather than to




A possible limiting factor in determining whether to cen-
trally or decentrally manage an item may well by the availa-
bility of funds. The Commanding Officer, Naval Supply Center,
San Diego, commented that decentralized management today
seems to be somewhat subject to dollar availability The
Naval Supply Center found that they were not managing local
stocks in the best way possible, since for many commodities
it was not possible to follow economic order quantity concepts,
due to fund limitations. For instance, although it was mani-
festly more economical to buy 10 months stock of an item,
applying the EOQ formula, the restrictions on funds available
forced them to buy only 3 months stock. This requires the
purchase to be made over three times as often, thus greatly
increasing management costs. ° The availability of funds,
29Rear Admiral L. P. Kimball, Jr., SC S USN, Com-




could, of course, be a limiting factor in either centralized or
decentralized management. At the present time, however,
adequate funds have been available to central managers to
apply the EOQ concept, where applicable, whereas those items
for which DSA is responsible, and have been decentralized to
Navy managers at the local level, have been subject to rather
severe financial limitations ,30
Military Specification Control
Specification control is a two sided coin, and presents
both advantages and disadvantages to the case for decentrali-
zation. On the one hand it would place a technical responsi-
bility on local procurement activities that they may not now
possess. It would require large technical files 9 and a much
greater knowledge of commodities than is now available at the
local level. It would also greatly increase inspection responsi-
bilities, which are presently accomplished at the source level
for centrally managed bulk procurements by Inspectors of
Naval Material, Bureau of Weapons Representatives, and like
organizations. These increased responsibilities could well in-
crease the costs of local procurement beyond the economic
feasibility stage.
On the other hand, it is possible that we are buying
J Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Instruction 2+2+40,80
Supplement 14 dated 27 January 1962+ , Subject- Improvement
of Local Supply Decision Rules at Stock Points \ program for
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some quality in an item that is not required to satisfy local
requirements - some "gold plating", in effect. An example
that comes to mind is flashlights bought to a Military Speci-
fication, For many local requirements the standard hardware
store type commercial flashlight would be acceptable, rather
than the water-proof, shock-proof, anti-sparking, corrosion-
resistant qualities incorporated in the MILSPEC item. There
is a legitimate reason for the MILSPEC item, which we make
all purposeful in order to compress the range of items, but
it may not be the most economical buy for all requirements,
particularly the stateside non-military type requirements
Opportunity Losses
If one assumes that decentralized management provides
more personalized scrutiny of requirements and stock levels 9
the losses associated with non-fulfillment of a requirement
should be considered. In a military organization this is hard
to quantify, because we do not have opportunity losses that
private enterprises have.. In effect we have a captive mar-
ket, and we cannot rubber-stamp the demand "cut of stock,
try us again next month". There are losses associated with
non receipt of material that can be quantified in terms of
down time for vehicles and aircraft and the resultant re-
scheduling of jobs. It should be determined which type manage-
ment provides the best service and these opportunity losses





The non-economic factors previously discussed are indi-
vidually and collectively sufficient justification to continue
centralized management of a supply item, There is little
point in considering an item for decentralization if it is not
available commercially, has a high degree of military essenti-
ality, or any of the other non-economic factors that favor
or dictate central management. Once these factors have been
considered, and the item meets the decentralization criteria
from a non-economic standpoint, it becomes necessary to
examine the economic factors and determine which system is
the most advantageous in terms of dollars.
Government spending, in particularly military spending in
peacetime, will continually be subject to review by the GAO
and other agencies concerned with public spending . Unless
there are overriding military decisions that dictate a more
expensive method of operation we should be striving for that,
system that "provides the most bang for the bucks" There
should be increased recognition and awareness that military
decisions, whether they specifically involve budget allocations
or not, are in one of their most important aspects economic
decisions; and that unless the right questions are asked, the
appropriate alternatives selected for comparison, and an eco-
nomic criterion used for choosing the most efficient, military

power and national security will suffer, 31
The ultimate goal is to arrive at a mathematical model
that could make the determination of decentralization, but in
order to do this, all pertinent economic factors must be
analyzed.
Volume Purchases
It is generally considered that savings in purchase price
can be effected by quantity buys on the theory that unit
prices will decrease as the quantity increases, Economists
generally believe that at sufficiently small outputs, efficiency
increases with size, chiefly because of the possibility of
specialization of labor and equipment with a resultant decrease
in cost to produce.
3
2 Large buys do not necessarily ensure
the cheapest price, however. Due to economies of scale,
prices will tend to fall with added output, until you reach
the point of diminishing returns, and then the prices will start
back up. Stigler defines the law of diminishing returns, "As
equal increments of one output are added, the outputs of
other productive services being held constant, beyond a cer-
tain point the resulting increments of product will decrease,





^George <J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (New York;






certain point" must be interpreted as a point within the pro-
ductive range of industry. In addition prices may rise at the
point in expanded productivity that efficiency begins to fall
off, due to sluggish and bureaucratic tendencies of the firm
at the increased level. 34
Another factor that might affect prices is that the
requirements being generated are in excess of the lowest
bidder's capacity to produce. This then forces the purchaser
to take higher prices than could be obtained with decentralized
procurement and resultant smaller quantities. J
Savings attributable to centralized procurement have not
been clearly identified. GAO , in the referenced report, used
a figure of 30$ of the unit cost as savings of centralized
procurement .3° Defense General Supply Center noted that
costs at decentralized activities ran as high as 180$ to higher
than 400$ of centralized costs.
This is probably the largest single area of savings that
can be attributed to centralized management, The savings no
doubt will vary with the commodity involved, but it is a fac-




35Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition (Chicago
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), pp. 109-180,





Under the Defense Supply Agency distribution system,
material is positioned at an intermediate depot, as opposed to
the Navy's system of delivering the material directly to the
user activity, based on a best guess of the ultimate user,
both as to location and quantity. DSA has made some con-
cessions to the Navy in this area by the use of Specialized
Support Points (SSP) and Direct Supply Support Points
(DSSP).37 The SSP's at Norfolk and Oakland carry a full
range of items for all DSA commodities with full management
by the Navy. The DSSP's are located primarily at Air Sta-
tions, Shipyards and maintenance shops, and carry a range of
specialized selected items of high volume usage, DSA retains
ownership of all wholesale stocks under both systems until
issued. The assumption made by GAO in the referenced re-
port appears to be that the decentralized manager would be
the ultimate user of the item, and that decentralized items
would be available locally.
Under a centralized system, using an interim level depot
to hold, the system is susceptible to first destination, second
destination, and redistribution transportation costs. Decen-
tralized management would be faced with first destination
^'Department of Defense, Defense Supply Agency




costs, but they would probably be built into the cost of the
commercially available item, unless it is locally manufactured
(most unlikely for a very large range of items). There should
be no second destination or redistribution costs connected with
decentralized management.
Holding Costs
Holding costs include such costs as deteriorations, obso-
lescence, interest on investment, amortization of capital
investment (facilities), overhead costs including personnel,
utilities and supplies. Under a centralized management system
the holding costs could be a substantial cost but would not
be experienced under decentralized management because of the
intermediate stocking level. The constant cost of a local
holding cost under a decentralized stocking system would be
experienced under either system and could therefore be disre-
garded. If, however, one assumes that inventories would be
substantially less under a decentralized system , then a decrease
in local holding costs would also have to be considered » GAO
,
in their report, stated that the entire range of 553 » 000 items
would not be stocked, therefore freeing $275*000,000 of un-
necessary inventory. The Defense General Supply Center,
however, takes the position that a local inventory policy would
not differ greatly for a depot stocked item and a locally pro-
cured item, 3° jf £ne inventory policy does differ increased
38Defense General Supply Center, P and P Number 701-1,
op . cit . , Enclosure (2), Note ID.

costs would be experienced by more frequent procurements at
the local level.
GAO, using the $275
»
000, 000 as excess inventory computed
a 3% interest on investment, or an annual cost of $8,000 9 000
.
Hitch and McKean use a figure of 6 to 8 percent, which includes
interest plus a risk premium. ' In computing the interest, the
future values of items and therefore the undiscounted amounts
of future costs are extremely important. Future costs should
be discounted, but distant amounts should be weighted less
heavily than present ones. A dollar is worth more now than
10 years from now because (1) it can produce something or
"grow" in the meantime, and (2) we prefer a unit of satis-
faction now to one 10 years from now.
Administrative Costs
In determining the economics of centralized versus de-
centralized procurement, administrative cost to procure at the
various levels will be a small factor, An assumption must
first be made of the procurement and stocking policy of de-
centralized management, If it is considered that the decen-
tralized item has such low demand as to not warrant stocking
but will be bought on an "as required basis" many more pro-
curements will be required at the local level, thus increasing
local procurement costs. If the stocking policy is the same




under decentralized and centralized management there are other
considerations. In the GAO report it was stated that there-
was little difference in cost to the local user between requi-
sitioning from the higher echelon or procuring locally . They
also stated that the Air Force study on this subject indicated
that the costs of local procurement were exceeded by savings
in other functions such as report preparation, requisitioning
costs, packing and crating, and storage. The Defense Gen-
eral Supply Center report on this subject also indicated that
local procurement costs and local requisitioning costs were sub-
stantially equal and therefore should not be an economic con-
sideration in management decision.
One of the big projects in the requisitioning area in the
past few years has been the Military Standard Requisitoning
and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP Program), It would appear
that this program, if successful, would go a long way in re-
ducing requisitioning costs, since it used punch card format
and EAM equipment. Also, there are no inspection procedures
or bill processing involved in requisitioning as opposed to local
procurement. In spite of the statements by GAO and other-
agencies it is felt that this facet should be more carefully
analyzed from the cost standpoint,, Cost figures per line
item or per requisition at the central management level should




A military supply system is subject to making many pro-
curements of items that will never be used, due to rapidly
changing equipments, changing missions, economic conditions,
and certainly a lack of coordination between user and purchaser,
due to the size of the organization . These purchases are
legend in newspaper articles, and make excellent material for
politicians to impress their constituents •
It therefore behooves the military to use the best system
available to hold these excess losses to a minimum. In the
field of missiles and aircraft or any technical procurement
the losses are extremely high, because of the low return on
sale of excesses in these areas, This problem should be care-
fully studied to determine whether decentralized management
would hold losses to a minimum or whether they would actu-
ally increase when compared to losses attributable to central
management.
The stocking policy in decentralized management will
again be a big factor. If the policy is to buy only for im-
mediate requirements then excesses should be held to a bare
minimum, though many more procurements will be required than
with central management.
By decentralizing, the advantages of redistribution of
excesses by a central manager are lost, since he will not have
the information available centrally on a system basis „ He has
hi

also lost the ability to examine the range of items and take
policing action to compress this range by standardization and
redistribution
.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF ECONOMIC FACTORS
Although there are many unresolved areas in the noneco-
nomic factors that require further study, once these have
been resolved, the economic decision boils down to the follow-
ing: How do the central costs, composed of the central unit
price, cost to order, and cost to hold compare with the local
unit cost to procure, the cost to order, and the cost to hold*
The Defense General Supply Center has developed a
mathematical model to quantify the costs of centralized man-
agement versus decentralized management of supply items so
that a comparison of the annual costs can be made, The
model is reproduced below.
Annual Centralized Management Costs - TEC(C)
TEC(C) = Order Cost + Holding Cost + Cost of Item
12B PC SL D x H x UPC + D x UPC
— ——— -4. -—— -I- V - iPC 2 12
Cost as % of Sales = TEC(C) x 100
D x UPC
Annual Decentralized Management Costs - TEC(D)
Defense General Supply Center, Richmond, Virginia




TEC(D) = Order Cost + Holding Cost + Cost of Item
= (See note) + (See note) + D x UPD




Note: The following costs are equal and therefore excluded^
From Centralized Costs From Decentralized Cost.
Requisitioning Cost = Cost to Procure
Cost to Hold Locally - Cost to Hold
UPC - Estimated unit price - Centralized management
UPD - Estimated unit price - Decentralized management
PC - Order quantity in months of supply
SL - Safety level in months of supply
D - Annual demand in units
H - Holding cost rate
B - Cost to procure
This model covers the basic elements considered necessary
to make the economic decisions. There are, however, two
assumptions which are made that may be applicable to DGSC
supported activities, but would require further investigation
if projected across the entire DOD supply system „ (1) DGSC
disregarded "cost to hold" locally in the model on the assump-
tion that the station's inventory policies will not differ greatly
for a depot stocked item and a locally procured item „ This
is not in keeping with the GAO report when it was estimated
that $275 million in inventories could be freed under decentral-
ized management. (2) DGSC stated that requisitioning costs
under central management were equal to "cost to procure"
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under decentralized management. This is an area that requires
further investigation, particularly with the implementation of
MILSTRIP procedures.
It is the writers' opinion that the model should be ex-
panded to include the following?
Annual Centralized Management Costs - TEC(C)
TEC(C) = Order Cost + Holding Cost + Cost of Item +
Requisitioning Cost + Cost to Hold Locally-
Annual Decentralized Management Costs - TEC(D)






The GAO report makes a clear case that there are many-
items in the Department of Defense supply system that should
be examined critically for decentralization. There are a wide
range of low volume, low cost items that would lend themselves
to decentralized management at a considerable savings to the
services and little, if any, loss of responsiveness <,
The statistical methods employed by GAO in arriving at
the projected percentage of items that could be decentralized
are subject to some skepticism that the results are statisti-
cally unbiased. It was not the intention of this paper to dis-
prove GAO's statistics, but to examine them and offer some
objective method of determining a decentralization policy . By
the same token the cost savings and excess inventory figures
are open to debate. Nevertheless, the basic conclusions of
GAO are quite sound and it is evident from the report that
the various supply agencies have not carried out the intentions
of DOD Instructions as extensively as possible, or as neces-
sary to attain optimal supply management,
It is known that the Defense Supply Agency is conducting
an intensive study on the subject of total costs to manage
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DSA items of supply .^l The impetus for this study is at
least in part attributable to the GAO report on uneconomical
management of commercially available items » Undoubtedly since
DSA has assumed management of the bulk of common items
these items would lend themselves more readily to commercial
availability than the remaining technical items managed by the
individual services. From available correspondence on the sub-
ject we were unable to determine that the Navy was taking
any action on the subject. It is recommended that the Navy
implement a similar study to enable their supply managers to
make immediate decisions on decentralization . Although not a
complete list, it is considered that the noneconomic factors
listed in Chapter IV would form a good basis for selection
of items for a decentralized review. It is patently obvious
that unless an item can qualify for the noneconomic factors,
there is little use to compute the economic factors. The
first consideration in this decision should be the commercial
availability - if the item is not available in sufficient quantities
and in adequate time - there is no need to proceed further «,
The other items could be in the nature of a check list, ranked
by their relative importance. Once the item meets all the
criteria of the noneconomic factors, the big test of the eco-
nomics of the decision should be determined.
* Commander R. <J . Knobel, SC, USN , Defense Supply




As a final comment on the subjec t of decentralization,
the reply of the Defense Industrial Supply Center to a DSA
letter on "Control and Supply of Material" sounds an ominous
note of warning. Paragraphs 3 and 1+ of the letter are quoted
belows^
3. With respect to this policy, it is important to note
that in the studies undertaken and in the policy dec-
larations issued subsequent to its establishment, the
Defense Supply Agency has given a broad and inclusive
interpretation to the concept of integrated managemento
Under this interpretation, a center's responsibility
begins with the provisioning conference, includes screen-
ing for item entry control, involves the obtaining of the
federal stock number, the procurement and positioning
within the DSA distribution system of initial retail
support requirements and the subsequent procurement or
procurement and stocking of wholesale support require-
ments. A center's responsibilities also include the
requirement for performing standardization studies and
for terminating items as rapidly as circumstances permit,
Thus, an opportunity is presented for a single agency to
police the entry of items into the DOD supply system, to
act as the procurement and storage agency for the needs
of all the services and to reduce through standardization
action and otherwise the excessive number of items now
in the Defense Supply System.
4. Decentralization of an item in the face of these
assumed responsibilities and the opportunity they present
does not appear proper. In the first place, decentrali-
zation neither eliminated procurement nor prevents stock-
age. It dissipates the former and both dissipates and
hides the latter, leading once again to multi-service pro-
curement and stockage of common military supplies ,
Secondly, decentralization divides management responsi-
bility, leaving with the centers all responsibility except
those pertaining to procurement and stocking, returning
these to the very services that delegated them to the
^"Commander, Defense Industrial Supply Center letter
dated 29 April 1963 , Subjects Proposed DSA Regulation
"Control and Supply of Material"
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centers when the items were first coded for integrated
management. The act of decentralization also denies
on a routine basis two elements of supply intelligence
necessary for the total management of an item, This
lack of procurement and usage information will in an
emergency prevent a center from providing adequate
supply support for decentralized items which in that
event must be returned to central management. It is
a well accepted maxim that in time of peace we have
the only opportunity to prepare for war, The best
preparation for that event comes from the experience
centers gain from the day-to-day management of the
items for which they are responsible J Finally, the poli-
cy cannot be implemented completely. The Defense
Supply Agency has recognized this fact by requiring
DSCs to procure a decentralized item at the request
of military activities. Thus, centers must be prepared
to perform on an exception basis a function that stand-
ardized requisitioning procedures, rapid communication
systems and advanced data processing equipment make
administratively and economically feasible routinely.
In short, this quote expresses the writers' feelings that
we have worked for many years to arrive at a central system
of inventory management, hopefully under one organization
(DSA) ultimately, and if the concept of decentralization is
allowed to run rampant we could regress to the supply system
of mid to late 1940's, with its overtones of duplication, ex-
panded range of items and nonstandardization of materials,
Therefore the decentralization policy should be rigidly controlled
,
notwithstanding the fact that decentralization is extremely
desirable for an economic standpoint.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
It is recommended that the following areas be further
investigated with the purpose of determining the affect each
5h

has on the problem of supply management.
Holding Costs
There was not sufficient information available to adequately
determine the impact of holding costs in an economic decision
to decentralize, The Defense General Supply Center's figure
of 15% for holding costs could not be analyzed due to lack of
information on the breakdown of the costs. This area is of
sufficient importance because of its affect on the economic
decision to warrant a further separate study, It is also
closely associated with the study on inventory policy
„
Inventory Policy
The subject of whether to stock under decentralisation
or to buy known requirements was not clearly defined in the
GAO report. The decision on this policy will affect many
factors, both economic and noneconomico It is recommended
that further study on this subject be conducted due to its
impact on the whole problem,
Availability of Information at the Local Level
A decentralization management decision will require that
many decisions formerly made centrally will now be made locally.
Access to, and availability of, all information formerly available
to a large central agency would have to be distributed to a
great many users in a widely dispersed area. It is felt that




Requisitioning Costs Versus Local Purchase Costs
From available information, it did not appear that the
Navy had done much work on this subject. In order to make
a meaningful comparison, the costs to requisition from the next
higher echelon of supply should be carefully compared against
all the costs to procure locally, including inspection costs, pro-
curement costs, technical analysis of requirements and contract
administration
.
Military Essentiality and Mobilization Reserves
The problem of military essentiality was hardly touched
upon in the GAO report. All inventory managers should con-
sider this feature in decentralizing and from the information
available to us, this problem requires further study and some
common guidelines.
r
Responsiveness of Commercial Market and GSA
The test of the success of decentralization cannot be
entirely tied to a dollar savings. The commercial market, or
GSA, must be responsive to the military demands. So far
this has not been tested to any great degree, and GAO
based their report on replies from retailers, wholesalers and
manufacturers, rather than on actual demands placed upon
these outlets. Prior to making mass decentralization, a
study should be conducted to actually test the responsiveness
of these sources of supply.
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Ships and Overseas Supply Support by Port Procurement
The impact of a decentralized policy on deployed ships
and overseas bases merits further study „ GAO touched very
lightly on the Navy's position on this matter, and the affect
of commercial buying of requests from these activities, as
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